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This paper applies the theory of networks to the problem
of how agents should assign weights to other agents in the
Lehrer-Wagner model for consensus formation. The Lehrer-
Wagner theory of consensus is introduced, and the problem
of weight assignment is highlighted as one of the open prob-
lems for the theory. The paper argues that the application
of the theory of networks to the Lehrer-Wagner model con-
stitutes an interesting and fruitful option, among others, for
the problem of weight assignment.
1 Social epistemology and consensus models
How consensus is formed, that is how situations of disagreement are resolved,
is a central topic in social epistemology. Traditionally, epistemologists have
been concerned, among other topics, with the problems related to belief
formation from an individual perspective, but there is also a very important
social dimension to that phenomenon.
The idea that group judgment has important epistemic advantages over
individual judgment has been treated from numerous perspectives, although
the formal treatment of the problem dates back to only a few centuries, with
the marquis de Condorcet and the now renown theorem named after him,
the Condorcet jury theorem (see List and Goodin 2001; Young 1988). Since
then, research in social choice theory, psychology, and social epistemology
has highlighted the epistemic advantages as well as disadvantages of group
deliberation and group decision making (see Kitcher 1990; Aaken et al.
2004; Goldman 1999).
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It is in the context just outlined that in the past half century formal
methods for consensus have been developed and studied. Consensus is par-
ticularly difficult to obtain with formal methods, as it involves not only the
aggregation of individual beliefs or attitudes, but also the endorsement of
such attitudes by all the members of a group. This is the main characteristic
that distinguishes consensus models from voting procedures in general.
One of the most important works on consensual and its formal treatment
is in a number of studies conducted in the late 70s and early 80s by the
philosopher Keith Lehrer and the mathematician Carl Wagner — to cite a
few, Wagner (1978), Lehrer (1976) and especially their joint Lehrer and
Wagner (1981). Those works laid the foundation for what is now known as
the Lehrer-Wagner model for consensus.
That model, together with the many discussions and issues that it raises,
will be the central topic of the following sections.
2 The Lehrer-Wagner Model
Lehrer and Wagner (1981) develops a consensus model based on the conver-
gence properties of Markov Chains. The model model produces consensus by
means of iterated weighted averaging of the beliefs that a group’s members
may have on an issue object of disagreement. There are essentially three
stages in the model, which will be illustrated in the following paragraphs.
In the first stage the agents in the model (the disagreeing agents, or
parties) assign a certain measure mij to themselves and to all others, where
m ∈ (0, 1), and where i is the agent assigning the measure, and j is the
agent receiving it. These measures form a N × N matrix W , with entries
wij , where N denotes the size of the group and each raw Wi∗ is normalized,
that is, wij =
mijPn
j=1Nij




w11 w12 . . . w1N
w21 w22 . . . w2N
. . . . . . . . . . . .
wN1 wN2 . . . wNN

In the second step, agents provide their judgment p on the subject matter
on which the group is deliberating. These judgments form a column of









In the final stage, consensus is produced by multiplying the matrix of
weights k times, and then by the column of probabilities P : that is, W kP .
A theorem shows that, under certain conditions, the values of the obtaining
column PC will be equal to each other as the powers k of W rise.
(The Consensual probabilities column) PC = W kP for k →∞ (1)
The conditions for convergence1 of the values of P are that the weights
in each row of W be normalized (see above), and that the matrix W be not
reducible2.
The reason why the model is more than a pooling algorithm for combin-
ing information cannot be easily summarized, and defending the model as
a consensus model is beyond the scope of this paper. In short, the idea is
that agents in the Lehrer-Wagner model are giving each other a weight, as
an indication of their willingness that the group’s opinion be a function of
the opinions of all members in the group (Wagner 1978).
The difference from a simple weighted average is that Lehrer-Wagner
works by making individuals converge slowly on a consensual value, rather
than amalgamating all the individual information in a one-step procedure.
However, what exactly the meaning of consensus is, in the Lehrer-Wagner
framework, is a controversial matter and cannot be investigated in details
in this paper3. In this paper, I assume that the model produces a real
consensus, whatever the meaning of ‘consensus’ may be, and the rest of
the discussion will focus on the problem of how agents in the model assign
weights to each other.
1Proof of convergence under the stated conditions is omitted here, but can be found in
Lehrer and Wagner (1981, pp. 129-133) and in Golub and Jackson (2007).
2More on the condition of reducibility will be said in section 3, while discussing a
possible method for assigning weights. For the mathematical notion of reducible matrices
see Meyer (2000, pp. 209, 671).
3The interested reader can refer to Goodin (2001); Lehrer (2001); Bradley (2006) for
some examples of the controversy.
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3 The problem of weight assignment in the
Lehrer-Wagner model
How agents are to assign weights to one another remains one of the major
unsolved problems in the Lehrer-Wagner model. Lehrer and Wagner (1981)
does not give a strategy or algorithm for assigning weights, although four
different examples of possible assignments are given. The first three exam-
ples involve some mechanical procedures for aggregating information and,
in those, weights are not meant to represent trust or confidence in other
agents’ judgments, but rather some more or less objective quantity. The
fourth example, on the other hand, makes weights dependent on subjective
assignments.
When a decision problem involves neither highly structured esti-
mation subject to a prior analysis of weighting schemes, as in the
examples 1 and 2 above, nor a statistical record of past perfor-
mance, as in the preceding example, then the choice of weights
becomes a subjective enterprise. (Lehrer and Wagner 1981, 140)
The idea of a subjective assignment of weights seems to be what drives
the consensual nature of the model (see Lehrer 1976), nevertheless making
the assignment of weights a “subjective enterprise”, rises a number of prob-
lems that have been pointed out in the subsequent literature on consensus.
One of the main critical stances on subjective assignment of weights is in
Regan et al. (2006); the paper takes the Lehrer-Wagner model as a practical
option for consensus seeking in medium-sized committees, such as the one
involved in the case study the authors analyze. Their case study involves
a panel of experts who are to formulate a list of criteria to be used in the
selection of urban open spaces for a Californian environmental conservation
project.
The problem is neither an entirely scientific one, because the list of cri-
teria involves considerations too complex and multi-disciplinary for relying
entirely on “hard science”, nor entirely subjective, since important factors
for evaluation need to be assessed on the basis of specific expert knowledge.
Moreover, the agreement will most likely be influenced by stakeholders’ in-
terests and personal preferences.
In such context, it is argued in Regan et al. (2006), the Leher-Wagner
model could provide a useful framework in order for the committee to achieve
a consensus that takes into consideration not only the opinions of each ex-
pert, but also the weights associated with their opinions. As the authors
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note however, asking experts to subjectively assign weights to each other
would be open to a number of theoretical and practical problems. In the
first place, it would be a very impractical task to ask each member of the
committee to assign a weight to all his or her fellows. Secondly members may
hide their true agendas in order to manipulate the results from the model4.
Thirdly, Regan et al. (2006) provides an argument that is reported in full
below as it is difficult to summarize.
Third, and most important, the assignment of a numerical value
on a person’s degree of respect for each of the other members in
the group is abstract and provocative. While most people would
agree that they have different degrees of respect for, or agree-
ment with, other group members’ positions, translating that to
a numerical value is non- trivial. Furthermore, group members
may feel reluctant to explicitly quantify degrees of respect for
other group members, or reveal their true weight of respect, as
it could lead to rifts and ill feeling within the group. (Regan et
al. 2006, 172)
For these reasons, the authors propose a method for assigning weights
based on the relative distance of two agent’s opinions. In other words, the
weight wij that agent i assigns to agent j will be a function of the distance
between agent i’s and agent j’s opinions5.
A similar suggestion has also been put forth in Hegselman and Krause
(2002). There, the authors present the Bounded Confidence model, a model
for consensus similar to the Lehrer-Wagner6, and suggest that agents aggre-
gate their opinion only with those other agents whose opinion is at a certain
distance ε from their own. In other words, the admitted weights are only
0 and 1 — agent i will assign weight 1 to agent j if and only if agent j’s
opinion lies within the “confidence interval” ‘± ε’ from hers, otherwise, she
will give agent j weight 0.
Both the proposals in Regan et al. (2006) and Hegselman and Krause
(2002) have a number of advantages, in particular, they solve the problems
4Nurmi shows that the Leher-Wagner model, when weights are assinged subjectively,
is manipulable (see Nurmi 1985, 15: Proposition 1 ).
5Details on the function and derivation of weights are left to the interested reader (see
Regan et al. 2006, 172).
6In fact, the Bounded Confidence model is a special case of the extended version of
the Lehrer-Wagner, the presentation of which was omitted from section 2; the interested
reader can refer to chapter 4: The extended model in Lehrer and Wagner (1981).
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highlighted in Regan et al. (2006). Weights are no longer assigned sub-
jectively, thus avoiding, in part, manipulability of the assignment, and are
derived from the information about the agents’ opinions, thus providing an
economic, easily quantifiable, and “sentiment free” measurement.
There are, however, also drawbacks to the that proposal. For example,
imagine a case in which the decision on which the group is seeking agree-
ment is, by nature, highly polarizing (e.g. people feel very highly about the
outcome of the decision). The goal is to obtain a solution that be not only
the win of a majority, but a function of all the group member’s opinions.
Adopting either of the two aforementioned solutions would not achieve
the goal of promoting agreement, rather the opposite effect of polarizing the
two groups. In particular, an extreme type of manipulation is still possible
with the Regan proposal: members of the two subgroups may conceal their
true opinion and decide to give an extreme opinion (1 or 0), knowing that
it is opposite to the opinion of the other subgroup. If the other subgroup
does the same, the matrix will “polarize”7 into two submatrices which will
converge independently to two different values8.
The Bounded Confidence model has similar problems. As Hegselman
and Krause (2002) shows, in a important number of cases (if ε is “large
enough”), the model converges to two, or more, independent opinions, mean-
ing that the original opinions of the group’s members stabilize on multiple
non-communicating convergent paths (see Hegselman and Krause 2002, 10-
20).
A possible reply to the challenges illustrated above is that it is pointless
to seek for the ultimate method that solves all problems. In general, however,
there seems to be a question to be asked about the rationality of deriving
weights from distance in opinion, method that, in different ways, both Regan
et al. (2006) and Hegselman and Krause (2002) adopt. The method is
rational insofar as it is rational to expect that people will tend to converge
towards those positions that are closer to theirs9. It is also a very economical
7In technical language, a matrix so contructed is said to be reducible. Reducible matri-
ces do not converge to a unique value but to n values, where n is the number of submatrices
that can be produced from the main matrix. For more details on the condition see Meyer
(2000, pp. 209, 671).
8That this type of manipulation is possible can be seen from the function for the
derivation of weights in Regan et al. (2006, 172): wij =
1−|pi−pj |Pn
j=1 1−|pi−pj |
. If i’s opinion is
1 and j’s opinion is 0, then wij will be a null weight
9I have so far taken both methods in Regan et al. (2006) and Hegselman and Krause
(2002) to be normative in character. Whereas this is quite uncontroversial for the former,
it is arguable whether the latter should be taken as a normative model. In principle,
nonetheless, there seems to be no reason for prohibiting that it be taken normatively,
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method, as all the information that is needed for convergence is already
present in the opinions of the group.
Nonetheless, in light of some of the problems illustrated below, it should
be taken as one of a number of possible solutions, each of which has advan-
tages as well as disadvantages. It is in the light of that that in the next
section I will present an alternative method for assigning weights, one that
seems particularly fruitful for counterbalancing, for example, the dynamics
that tend to make a group split on a very polarizing issue.
4 Deriving weights from a network’s structure
4.1 Social influence and networks
The method for the assignment of weights suggested in this section take its
rationality from the observation that, in real life, groups do not come in the
idealized form that is often assumed by most consensus models. Lehrer and
Wagner (1981) assumes that agents give honest assignments of weights.
[. . . ] if, on the contrary, the weights represent an egoistic at-
tempt to manipulate social decisions making, then it is unac-
ceptable to use those weights though they were a disinterested
summary of information.” (Lehrer and Wagner 1981, 74).
However, honest assignments cannot be taken as a realistic assumption.
A member of a group may tend towards the opinion of other members not
necessarily because those opinions are similar to hers, but also for a number
of other possible reasons, e.g. political or economic interest, kinship, etc. In
other words, in several concrete scenarios, people are not, so to speak, “on
equal grounds”, but rather “networked”, to wit, organized in a structure
(a network) in which the degree of connectedness of different agents varies
depending on that agent’s position in the network.
Network theory10 has recently drawn attention to the phenomenon of
network formation and on how a network can affect the information flow in
a group. This literature has evolved especially in economics and sociology;
for example, DeMarzo et al. (2003) addresses the problem of how persuasion
regardless of the original authors’ intentions. Besides, also from a descriptive point of
view, weights need not be derived as a function of the distance of two agents’ opinions
— sometimes we give a high weight to people who are close to us (a friend or a business
partner) even when their opinion is not similar to ours.
10For a recent comprehensive treatment of networks in economic and sociology see Jack-
son (2008).
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bias can be more effective depending on how well-connected an agent is in
the group.
Biases, persuasion and the structure of a certain network can arise from
disparate situations - a city council’s members may be linked more or less
strongly by political, economic and even family-related interests. Similarly,
the members of an environmental panel may be linked by reasons of national
interest, ideology or a number of other factors that will sway such opinions
in one sense or another.
Golub and Jackson (2007) proposes a convergence model in which the
flow of information in the group is conveyed through the existent network.
They answer the question of which networks allow a deliberative group to
reach consensus and necessary and sufficient conditions for convergence are
provided. Golub and Jackson’s approach however, does not allow agents to
give different weights to one another if they are equidistant in the network.
The method suggested in this paper, on the other hand, allows for more
flexibility, viz. weights are not fixed for all links but are: a) dependent on the
total distance (in number of links) between agents and b) minimal variations
are allowed to occur in the attribution of weights even when agents’ mutual
positions are equidistant.
4.2 Network dependent weights
The idea behind a derivation of weights from the underlying network struc-
ture of the deliberating group is that there are scenarios in which agents
assign weights based on their preferences for, or biases towards, other agents.
Imagine the following scenario in which the group is composed of diplo-
mats from different countries. For simplicity I will assume that each agent
(each diplomat) has exactly two proximate neighbors. Agent A, is neighbor
with agents B and C, B will then be neighbor with A (the relation of being
neighbor is symmetric) and D, C on the other hand is neighbor with A and
E. Again, for simplicity, I assume that the group is small and that it is
closed, that is, there is a member F that has E and D as neighbors.
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Neighboring countries, in some cases, have common interests: trade,
military security, environmental safety, etc. As the distance between two
countries increases, however, those factors might play less and less a role in
their preferences towards one another.
From figure 1, a list of instructions for the derivation of weights can be
formulated, as illustrated in table 1.
Table 1: Weight-derivation for a six node graph
1. wyx ∈ (a, b) ⇐⇒ # edges between x and y is 0 (case for x = y)
2. wyx ∈ (b, c) ⇐⇒ # edges between x and y is 1 (where a 0 b)
3. wyx ∈ (c, d) ⇐⇒ # edges between x and y is 2 (where b 0 c)
4. wyx ∈ (d, e) ⇐⇒ # edges between x and y is 3 (where c 0 d)
Table 1 gives a simple set of rules for the derivation of weights based on
the relative distance (in number of nodes) from agent to agent. For example,
if a = 1; b = 0.8; c = 0.5; d = 0.3; e = 0, then wad ∈ (0.5, 0.3) because agent
A is two links away from agent D. According to the schema, an agent will
give herself a higher weight, her immediate neighbor a slightly lower weight,
her next neighbor an even lower weight, and so on. The schema can be
reformulated for any number of nodes in a ring-shaped network.
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5 Examples
5.1 A balanced network
Hartmann et al. (2009) analyzes the case of a ring-shaped network, like
the one presented in section 4.2, in order to provide a formal definition
of epistemic peers and investigate the dynamics of consensus formation.
Initially, the paper assumes a stricter schema for the assignment of weight,
such that if agent A is distant x nodes from agent B, then there is only one
possible weight that wab and wba can take. In other words, with reference
to table 1, each “ . . .∈ (a, b) . . . ” [or (b, c), etc.] is substituted by “. . . = α
. . . ” [or β, etc.], where α, β, etc. are fixed values between 0 and 1.
It is possible to show (see Hartmann et al. 2009, 116: Theorem 1 ) that
the consensual results deriving from the model are equal to the arithmetic
average of the values in the column P (see above, section 2). In the same
paper, it was shown that also relaxing the schema for the assignment of
weights (as from Table 1, above), the results are robust, that is, the consen-
sual values will be approximately equal (u) to the arithmetic average of the
column P .
What those result mean is that whenever the group forms a symmetric
network, like the one of figure 1 (or any isomorphic extension of that network
with more agents), the different weights assigned by agents to other agents
balance each other out and the situation is equivalent to that of a group
where agents assign no weights to one another.
In Hartmann et al. (2009), the analysis of the ring-shaped network in
combination with the Lehrer-Wagner model was used in order to justify an
“equal weight view” among epistemic peers (see Kelly 2005; Elga 2007).
In the context of this paper, however, the idea is to provide a rationale for
the derivation of weights from the underlying network structure, both from
a normative and a descriptive point of view.
More on the normative and descriptive implications of the analysis of
this paper will be said in section 5.3.
5.2 Other networks
The example provided in section 5.1 is only one of numerous possible network
formations that can in principle be studied. A thorough analysis of the
dynamics of consensus formation with the Lehrer-Wagner model has yet to
be carried out and is beyond the scope of this paper. The following remarks
will serve as an illustrations of the many theoretical possibilities that such
analysis could disclose.
10
The ring-shaped network is an example of an extremely regular network,
in which all the weights balance out. It could, as said before, represent a
number of countries that have a bias towards their neighbors, but whose
global effect would not influence the results of a consensus.
Other networks, however, are also of theoretical interest. For instance,
there may be groups in which one of the agents plays the role of the leader,
and to whom all other agents assign a high degree of respect or confidence (a
high weight). An example of this is what Elga calls ‘gurus’, that is “people to
whom we should defer entirely” (Elga 2007, 478). Identifying the presence
of a guru in a group might have important epistemic implications.
The epistemic value of the presence of a guru was one of the points left
open in Hartmann et al. (2009): “[. . . ] we did not address the question of
whether the leader bias is beneficial or not — this depends on the leader’s
factual competence and honesty. The Lehrer-Wagner model is silent on these
questions.” (Hartmann et al. 2009, 120).
The Lehrer-Wagner model, when weights are assigned subjectively, is
not sensitive to the presence of a leader in the group. However, in a star-like
network (see Figure 2), the consensus will be biased towards the opinion of
the leader11.










Deriving weights from a given star-shaped network would, on one hand,
allow us to represent a real case of consensus formation where a leader should
11For an explanation of this see Hartmann et al. (2009, 120: Theorem 3 )
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be present. On the other hand, from a normative point of view, it is to be
noted that the presence of the leader could be a positive one or a negative
one, depending on whether we deem the opinion of the leader in question a
“good” opinion or not.
With the scheme for deriving weights exemplified in table 1, if properly
modified, it is possible to balance the weights that agents assign to one
another so that the opinion of the leader will be weighted higher or lower,
depending on which of the two we deem as the appropriate strategy. For
example, if we deem the leader to be a negative influence on the group, the
schema for the assignment of weights could be built along the lines of table
2 below.
Table 2: Weight-derivation for a nine node graph
1. wyx ∈ (a, b) ⇐⇒ # edges between x and y is 0 (case for x = y)
2. wyx ∈ (b, c) ⇐⇒ # edges between x and y is 2 (where a 0 b)
3. wyx ∈ (d, e) ⇐⇒ # edges between x and y is 1 (where d c)
The derivation in table 2 implies that the influence of a leader, that
would normally sway the results of the consensus, is diminished. Agents
will still be giving more confidence (or preference) to the leader, due to the
preference structure of the network, but their opinions towards the leader,
will be automatically scaled down. The idea is that the consensus should
be a measure of an agent’s independent opinion on the matter under con-
sideration, so that factors affecting that independence, if possible to detect,
should be minimized.
5.3 Epistemic implications of network-dependent weights
At the end of section 3 it was said that the method for deriving weights
suggested in this paper should be taken as one of many possible methods,
each of which will have advantages as well as drawbacks. In this section
I will enumerate a number of reasons for justifying weight derivation on
the basis of the underlying network structure, both from a normative and
descriptive take on the model.
I start from the normative point of view, which was the one tacitly
assumed in section 3 (see footnote 9). The normative interpretation of the
Lehrer-Wagner model is the one endorsed in Regan et al. (2006). According
to that paper, weights should be assigned as a function of the distance be-
tween agents’ opinions. This is rational in those cases in which agents assign
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higher weights to agents with opinions similar to their own, for example, we
may think that musicians may assign higher value to other musicians with
similar tastes.
That scenario, however, need not always be the case. As I justified in
section 4.2 we can imagine cases in which we give a higher weight to someone
who is “close” to us, or whom we view as the leader, no matter what her
opinion on the matter under deliberation is. In all these cases the problem is
whether such preference, the influence of the network on the group’s decision,
is epistemically advantageous or not.
The main reason for normatively adopting a network-based derivation of
weights is that it is in principle possible to exploit the epistemic advantages
of a certain network or minimize its influence, depending on which one is
the recognized situation.
Some interpretations, however, see the Lehrer-Wagner model as a de-
scriptive model of consensus formation12. In the second part of this section
I will justify a network-depended assignment of weights from a descriptive
point of view.
A descriptive interpretation of the Lehrer-Wagner model claims that the
model is a representation, however idealized, of how consensus is formed,
rather than a deliberating method that groups should use in order to achieve
agreement.
Agents often seek consensus by deliberating and putting their opinions
together, and trying to come up with a “group opinion”. But the process is
not one of pure amalgamation, as some pooling algorithms may imply, rather
it is, normally, an iterative process, in which agents come closer and closer
to each other’s opinions until a single one emerges as the consensual one.
Moreover, it is reasonable to assume that agents will tend to assign (perhaps
unconsciously) some trust or confidence to other agents. The higher the
degree of trust I assign to agent i, the more i’s opinion will influence my
own opinion while moving towards the sought consensus.
How the mathematics of the Lehrer-Wagner model applies to the sit-
uation just depicted is fairly straightforward. The iterative nature of the
deliberating process is captured by the subsequent rounds of the model to-
wards convergence, and the measure of trust is represented by the weights
that agents assign to each other. For mathematical reasons, at each round
my opinion will be driven mostly by the opinion of those agents to whom I
12Indeed early versions of consensus models that use the properties of convergent Markov
chains make reference to DeGroot (1974), who takes the model to be descriptive in
character.
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have give higher weights — this is the idea that my opinion at each round
will be affected mostly by those agents that I deem more trustworthy.
An interesting extension of the idea of describing consensus formation
through the Lehrer-Wagner models is to apply the theory of networks to its
system of weight assignment. Some networks will, in concrete cases, affect
the formation of consensus, and it is in principle possible to study the effects
of the network on the consensus that is produced.
A very straightforward example will clarify the latter point. Figure 3,
represents a group in which two subgroups are present, groups (B,D,E, F )
and (C,G,H, I), and the two are linked by a “mediator” (A).








In this case it is clear the mediator plays a central role in the formation
of a consensus, as it is the only one that shares a certain measure of trust
or confidence with the two subgroups. Indeed, were A to be deleted from
figure 3, together with the two edges that link it with B and C, then the
two subgroups would not converge to a consensus, but to two independent
opinions, one driven by the communication of trust in subgroup (B,D,E, F ),
and the other driven by communication of trust in subgroup (C,G,H, I).
6 Conclusions
This paper started from considering a well known model for consensus forma-
tion, the Lehrer-Wagner model. The use of a formal model for the analysis
of consensus formation, as well as the development of a normative theory
of consensus, is a very fruitful approach for the study of consensus in social
epistemology.
The model developed by Lehrer and Wagner, however, besides providing
such useful tool of investigation, also opens a number of problems, among
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which the problem of how a group of agents should assign weights to one
another, or how to represent the distribution of weights (trust, confidence)
that is reasonable to assume takes place in a group seeking consensus.
The paper does not claim that there is a one-fit-all solution for determin-
ing weights — for example, the methods suggested in Regan et al. (2006)
and Hegselman and Krause (2002) seem to be fit for certain situations but
unfit for others.
Using some ideas from the theory of networks for determining weight
assignment among agents, however, seems to be a fruitful approach for those
of cases in which we wish to represent consensus in “networked groups”.
The examples provided in this paper, as well as the analysis in Hartmann
et al. (2009), constitute only a small fraction of a potentially large number
of possible applications, and further lines of investigation, in the topic of
consensus formation by means of formal models like the Lehrer-Wagner.
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